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Notes |
During the 1980's, Latin America was one of the major concerns of the U.S. foreign policy. Countries like Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Colombia had unstable governments and civil war created a clear and present danger to the national security of the United States. When the Cold War ended, so did some conflicts in that troubled region, and as such, the Latin America region took a back seat to events developing in the Middle East. In more recent times, Latin America was once again in the news as the civil war in Colombia became a serious threat not only to their neighboring countries in the Andean regions, but to the rest of the continent as well. The Colombian conflict began in the 50's and is very complex involving two basic issues: Control of the country and drugs by three warring groups: the government, the left-wing guerrillas and the right-wing paramilitary or cartels. The war in Colombia impacted the neighboring countries, in addition to fighting the Colombian army, the left-wing guerrillas kidnapped neighboring Venezuelan and Ecuadorians citizens and the right-wing paramilitaries smuggled weapons from bases along the Panamanian border. After years of intense anti-drug efforts and the destruction of the powerful Medellin and Cali Cartels, Colombia still remains the world's largest producer and exporter of cocaine and the second largest supplier of heroin to the United States. The Colombian civil war and drug war could not, and cannot, be solved alone. The country needed foreign aid as an international indirect intervention by the United States. This foreign aid would make a difference if it comes in the proper form. Military aid to train their police and military was considered extremely necessary. Adequate equipment such as helicopters and armored personnel carriers was also needed, as was, a new agriculture program for the peasants. During the Clinton Administration, the US government provided 1.7 billion dollars in aid packages, the largest in Latin American history. One billion went towards improving the Colombian military capacity to eradicate coca planting, which also included the purchase of helicopters, spare parts, training and intelligence equipment to help the army and police destroy coca crops and retake guerilla control areas. The other seven-hundred million would finance coca substitution programs, provide public work in sensitive regions and also provided improvements in Colombia's judicial system and human rights programs. This program was called "Plan Colombia" and was divided into a three-year package of seven billion dollars that included a number of loans not only from the U.S. but also from European countries. This program was designed to reconstruct Colombian institutions, sponsor regional development of the coca areas and help reduce, and ultimately destroy, all coca production. Plan Colombia was an important step in strengthening the country and the Colombian people understood that the drug issue was extremely critical because the guerrillas and para-military forces relied on the financial backing of drug traffickers to keep fighting. However, the Colombian people knew that the conflict involved more than drugs and that "Plan Colombia" would have needed the cooperation of the people of Colombia to make this happen. Colombian people have paid a high price; the cost of the war on drugs has been very high. In the last decade, over two-hundred bombs have blown up in Colombian cities, an entire democratic leftist political party was eliminated by right-wing paramilitaries, four presidential candidates, over two-hundred judges, 1200 police officers, members of the supreme court, more than one-hundred journalists and over 200,000 Colombian citizens have been murdered. It is without exaggeration that the Colombian government's conflict with the guerrillas could have been solved through negotiations. If the peace talk failed, the country would have gone into an all out war and ultimately, the Colombians would have lost their democracy. The U.S. government did not recognize the guerrilla groups that were wreaking havoc on their homeland, the Colombians knew them well as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (E.L.N). The future of Colombia could have only been achieved by having an open communication line between the U.S. government, the Colombian government and the left-wing guerrillas, which, unfortunately never occurred. This assessment of the situation in Colombia is based on an extensive examination of the following: historical manuscripts, constitutional documents, secondary sources, foreign news sources, various internet resources, video documentaries, scientific journals and biographies. This thesis is organized topically, using a series of chapters with accompanying sub-topics within the chapters to explain the always-unstable relationship between the United States and Colombia. How the situation in Colombia has evolved over the past fifty years to that paradoxical perspective of today, is the subject of this work. |
