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War in the South Atlantic : the mythology of the Monroe Doctrine and the Western Hemisphere idea : the Falkland Islands : a case study / Renee Monique Meunier

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Identifier	Thesis 1535
Author	Meunier, Renee Monique
Title	War in the South Atlantic : the mythology of the Monroe Doctrine and the Western Hemisphere idea : the Falkland Islands : a case study / Renee Monique Meunier
Publisher	Central Connecticut State University
Date	1999
Resource Type	Master's Thesis
Notes	On April 2, 1982, the British held Falkland Islands, two hundred and fifty miles, off the southeastern tip of Argentina, the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands were "invaded by several thousand Argentine Army, Navy and Air Force troops." Secretary of State Haig confirmed this "invasion" in a White House statement later that day advising the press that the United States "deplored the use of force to resolve this dispute." Significantly, the Secretary characterized the Argentine action as an "invasion." For those in the press corps who even knew where the Falklands were on that day, the opening salvo of what would soon become war in the South Atlantic may not have seemed very significant. But for the State Department it was. The Falklands had been ruled as a British Colony from England ever since 1833. The problem was that the Argentine government also claimed sovereignty over that desolate pile of rocks ever since that nation had gained its independence in 1816. Argentina maintained that it had inherited Spain's right to these islands. Although the British had controlled the island group for almost a hundred and fifty years with the enthusiastic approval of its overwhelmingly English population, all Argentine school children were still being taught that the Malvinas belonged to Argentina and that someday, sovereignty would be returned to the mainland. Samuel Johnson, writing in 1771, noted that "few spots of earth which in the desert of the ocean had almost escaped notice"...once, because of the rivalry between England and France, almost brought "the whole system of European empire to the point of convulsion." Some two hundred plus years later those convulsions had moved across the Atlantic to the Western Hemisphere and would place the United States in the difficult position of having to decide between two friends. In terms of achieving foreign policy objectives, the Argentine action posed serious problems for the United States. Within this hemisphere Argentina and the United States were members of the Organization of American States. In Europe, England and the United States provided the bulk of NATO's defense forces protecting the continent against the possibility of attack by Russia and the Warsaw Pact nations. Traditional friends and allies since World War I, this nation had looked after Britain's territorial possessions in the New World since the early 1900's. Why had Argentina taken this action? How would the United States react, who would they support? What was the obvious policy according to the dictates of the OAS charter? What should this nation do considering the Rio Pact, which, since 1947 claimed that an attack against one American state was an attack on all the American nations? The answers to these questions provide the thesis of this work. In reality, there was no choice for the United States foreign policy makers; they would have to support England. The reasons for this can be traced back to the earliest days of the colonial period, through the wars of independence in 1776 and 1812 and the aftermath of that struggle when there was a possibility that the European nations might assist Spain in re-conquering her New World possessions. In response to that fear President James Monroe promulgated his famous doctrine, which warned Europe that this nation would oppose any such attempt. Although this statement might have been the cause for some contempt on the part of certain European nations at the time, before the end of the century the Monroe Doctrine received the recognition and acquience of the most powerful nation on the Continent, England. In effect after the Spanish American War, the doctrine achieved a worldwide recognition that might have even surprised both John Quincy Adams and the President himself.
Subject	Falkland Islands War, 1982 Monroe doctrine United States -- Foreign relations
Department	International Studies
Advisor	Richard, Alfred Charles, 1937-
Type	Text
Digital Format	application/pdf
Language	eng
OCLC number	42530058
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War in the South Atlantic : the mythology of the Monroe Doctrine and the Western Hemisphere idea : the Falkland Islands : a case study / Renee Monique Meunier

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